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ABSTRACT 
 
According to Schumpeterian theories, economic expansions are associated with the 
introduction of successful new products, processes and services while depressions are linked 
to stagnant periods with few innovations. Can the economic crisis set in motion in 2008 be 
explained by the inability to innovate and upgrade production? And, conversely, will an 
economic recovery require a new stream of innovations? Drawing on the debate which 
emerged after the 1970s economic crisis, this paper tries to assess whether it is likely that the 
next long-term expansion will be linked to a new stream of innovations. While most evidence 
suggests that ICTs continue to provide the back-bone of economic activities, there is the 
prospect that biotechnology will eventually start to fulfil the promise envisaged over 30 years 
ago in the film Blade Runner. 
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1. Artificial life in Venice 
 
I was just a boy when, in 1982, fate led me to watch Blade Runner at the Venice Film 
Festival. Ridley Scott and Harrison Ford were there, but I was much more impressed and 
fascinated by the fantasy of new technologies than by the celebrities in the cinema. I was not 
the only one: the film and its seven different versions have since become a “cult movie” and 
have been analysed not only for their artistic meaning but also for their social, political and 
economic implications (see, for example, the variety of perspectives presented in Kerman, 
1997).  
I would like to explore here the film as an experiment in technological forecasting. 
Many prospective technologies presented in the film, such as flying vehicles, were already 
predicted by previous science fictions novels, films and cartoons. However, some devices 
struck my imagination: 
Electronics. Battery-operated electronic tills present everywhere, even in street kiosks. 
Voice-operated televisions. Gigantic electronic screens. Scanners (I do not think that the 
word even existed in 1982) that could in an instant enlarge photographs several times over. 
Biological artefacts. Artificial animals (e.g. snakes, owls, ostriches). Artificial body 
parts (human eyes). Living toys (dolls, puppets and tin soldiers). And, of course, the very 
hero of the film, the Replicant, an artificial human who could be distinguished from real 
humans only after undergoing a rather complex psychological / oculist test. 
Experts in science fiction will no doubt argue that any one of these innovations was 
already predicted in previous science fiction works.
1
 Nevertheless, the narrative of Blade 
Runner makes these manufactured biological artefacts realistic and impressive for their 
pervasive social diffusion, perhaps because it portrays a vision of an entire industry based on 
what we might label today as a ‘general purpose technology’ (for a discussion of the concept, 
see David, 1990; Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995), namely artificial life. 
One distinctive aspect of Blade Runner should be underlined. It did not present a totally 
new society: many things were almost identical to the civilization of the 1980s. The structure 
of social classes depicted in Blade Runner is rather similar to what existed at the time of the 
film’s release, and this is in itself an accomplished prediction since income inequality has 
become even greater in the last thirty years. Already Fritz Lange’s Metropolis (1927) had 
                                                 
1
 Thanks to a very knowledgeable reviewer, I have learnt that “bio-engineered” animals could be found in Olaf 
Stapledon’s Sirius, (1944) and that a mixture of humans and animals are also to be found in Cordwainer Smith’s 
The Dead Lady of Clown Town (1964). 
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depicted a social stratification in which lower classes re-entered a state of slavery, and Blade 
Runner shows that the new lumpen-proletariat of Marxist remembrance has a new 
competitor: the non-human class of the androids. Like Metropolis, the film represents a 
peculiar urban stratification of social classes: it is not horizontal, as when you have different 
neighbourhoods, but rather vertical: lower classes are low also because they live on the 
ground floor, while the upper classes reveal their highflying nature almost literally, 
occupying the top floors of skyscrapers. 
The dominant technologies are not identified by single innovations only, but by clusters 
of interrelated innovations. Surprisingly, however, the film fails to connect systematically the 
two clusters in Electronics and Biological artefacts. With the benefit of hindsight, we can 
today identify these technologies as belonging to two main clusters: “Information and 
Communication Technologies” (ICTs) and “Biotechnologies”. Seen from the perspective of 
the early 1980s, both ICTs and Biotech had a potential that was still unexplored and that 
appeared equally revolutionary and promising. 
After thirty years, I watched the film again in very exclusive company, namely that of 
my children. Like me, they found the film imaginative and exciting, but with some basic 
differences. On the one hand, all the innovations in the field of ICTs have become trivial for 
them: the mobiles in their pockets contain scanners, audio-visuals, photo enlargers and GPS 
navigators more powerful and much smaller than in the film. In the middle of the adventure, 
one of my kids wondered: “why does he not send an email with an attachment?”, and the 
question was not that silly. If we accept the intriguing idea that science fiction can influence 
innovation as much as innovation influences science fiction (Bassett et al., 2013), we can 
now say that this influence has been much stronger for ICTs than for Biotechnologies. Blade 
Runner underestimated the pace of change in ICTs, to the point that it does not forecast what 
has become the most significant innovation of the last decade or so, namely the web. The TV 
screens, GPS navigators and video-telephones pictured in the film are, by contemporary 
standards, big and chunky. 
On the other hand, none of the innovations in Biotechnology has to the same extent 
changed our lives. ICTs have created new companies and millions of jobs, and they have 
transformed the operation of traditional industries such as retailing. Biotechnologies, in spite 
of the massive investment in R&D, have not (yet) produced anything like the same effect. 
Biotechnology still has to produce the general purpose technology equivalent to the 
microprocessor and it remains confined to a very narrow niche.  
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2. Schumpeterian insights 
 
The idea that clusters of innovations generate phases of economic development is older 
than Blade Runner. Marxist and Schumpeterian economists have for a century or more tried 
to relate stages of development to the emergence and decline of different technologies. 
According to this view, each historical period is dominated by the intensive and extensive use 
of specific production technologies. These technologies may be fostered or hampered by 
institutions and social beliefs, which often explain why they develop and are disseminated in 
some parts of the world rather than others. 
Crucial to the Schumpeterian insight is that innovations do not have an economic 
impact in isolation: they become dominant because they are applied in different contexts, 
shaping and transforming original ideas. Innovations could occur in different economic 
arenas (e.g. steam engines and textile machinery), but they are mixed and recombined in the 
economic and social fabric (e.g. the steam engine provided power for textile mills). When the 
new knowledge associated with a few emerging technologies starts to become widely 
diffused in economic life, then it will generate a phase of economic expansion. New 
technological opportunities stimulate and open up new industries that did not exist before, 
leading to job creation and structural change. When the opportunities start to dry up, it is 
likely that there will be a lower rate of economic growth or even an economic crisis.  
Regular patterns are always difficult to recognize, but Schumpeterian economists have 
attempted to identify five phases of capitalist development, each associated with a cluster of 
dominant technologies (Schumpeter, 1939; Freeman, 1984b; Mandel, 1995; Freeman and 
Louçã, 2001). Chris Freeman (1992) and Carlota Perez (2002) have termed these major 
phases “techno-economic paradigms”, identifying their key characteristics in terms of: i) core 
industries, ii) industrial organization, and iii) the modality to introduce innovations. Table 1 
summarizes the key characteristic of each techno-economic paradigm. 
Why do we need such a categorization? The main purpose is to understand the 
distinctive technological areas of a specific epoch and to trace their evolution. Archaeologists 
have found it useful to classify ancient societies into the Stone, Bronze and Iron Ages, since 
the techniques associated with each of these periods can explain quite a lot about their 
economic, social and even cultural and political life.
2
 These ages do not necessarily occur 
simultaneously: for example, anthropologists consider that aboriginal communities in 
                                                 
2
 This periodization was originally suggested by the Danish archaeologist, Christian Jürgensen Thomsen, in the 
1840s and it has since been widely applied.  
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Australia lived essentially in the Stone Age until the advent of European colonization.
 
Indeed, 
it is sometimes said that “uncontacted peoples” in remote parts of South America, Asia or 
Oceania continue to this day to live in the Stone Age. 
The French historian, Bernard Gille (1978), has further developed the archaeological 
approach by tracing the core “technical system” of each society. A technical system can be 
identified in terms of the core technologies used in a society and, above all, the 
interconnections between various devices. This requires the development of human skills to 
use the available techniques profitably, which in turn generates substantial changes in the 
distribution of employment across the various sectors of production. Mutual interdependence 
ensures the coherence and success of the overall economic and social system. 
One of the core characteristics of development is that only a few previous technologies 
become totally obsolete. The innovations introduced in the first industrial revolution continue 
to be with us and it is difficult to imagine our life without simple technological artefacts such 
as the myriad of mechanical devices that came to the fore during the Enlightenment. Of 
course, several products and services were replaced by alternatives that have become more 
popular: steam power has been substituted by the combustion engine and the combustion 
engine will, one hopes, be replaced in due course by solar power. The rate of change has been 
even faster in communications: pigeon-post has been substituted by telegrams and telegrams 
by email. There is no implication, of course, that the last method is superior to the previous 
one and some very progressive societies have occasionally returned to techniques previously 
considered obsolete. Cities like Amsterdam and Copenhagen, for example, are fighting to 
bring back bicycles and trams in order to get rid of automobiles. But by looking at the 
techniques used, it is possible to recognize each epoch and to distinguish the technologies 
driving change? 
The capitalist system in the last three centuries has made such development faster and 
more geographically comprehensive. Each phase can also be associated with the birth of 
firms with rather distinctive typologies. These companies are likely to exploit the new 
technological opportunities and organizational structures and to become the distinctive 
institutions of the new phase (see the last column of Table 1). When Keith Pavitt (1984) 
suggested his taxonomy of innovating companies, a taxonomy that proved very successful, 
one of his motivations was to show Freeman and his followers that innovative companies, 
with their expertise and competences, also need continuity, and more importantly that it was 
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crucial to understand the differences across firms in the way that they introduced 
innovations.
3
 
Even if it was originally designed to highlight the importance of knowledge 
accumulation in companies, institutions and nations, in one respect the taxonomy of Pavitt 
contributed, perhaps involuntarily, to the long wave theory, with each category of companies 
he identified being born in a specific stage. In a relatively short period of time, the emerging 
category became the dominant form of economic organization. The first industrial revolution 
is associated with the separation between traditional companies and producers of equipment, 
machinery and instruments. The second industrial revolution saw specialized suppliers 
becoming the front-runners of change. At the turn of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, a new type of 
firm emerged, based on the systematic exploration and exploitation of scientific opportunities 
in industries as diverse as chemicals, electrical machinery and engineering. We are familiar 
with the large companies based on Taylorism and Fordism that dominated most of the 20
th
 
century. And, of course, we have seen in the last thirty years how information-intensive 
companies, ranging from software producers to extensive users in banking and retailing, have 
shaped our lives. Pavitt himself had to face the problem of how quickly change could occur: 
information-intensive firms rose to prominence in just a few years. This category was absent 
in the first formulation of the taxonomy and had to be introduced a few years later (compare 
Pavitt, 1984 and 1990). 
Since Blade Runner was released, some of information intensie companies have 
become part of our daily life: Microsoft (US$87 billion sales in 2014), Apple (US$42 
billion), Google (US$66 billion), Amazon (US$89 billion), Oracle (US$ 37 billion) and 
Facebook (US$12 billion) were all anticipated by the imaginary Tyrell Corporation, perhaps 
also because, as predicted by Ridley Scott, they continue to be associated with the vision of 
successful entrepreneurs. These relatively new and fast-growing corporations co-exist with 
established companies that have opened up business lines to exploit new opportunities such 
as HP (US$ 111billion before the 2015 subdivision into two corporations) or Sony (US$ 65 
billion). One of the most significant cases of transformation of an old corporation is IBM, a 
company that has been in business for more than a century and that has managed to remain 
big and leading-edge by progressively abandoning its hardware component to embrace the 
emerging software services (Gerstner, 2002). This indicates that a new and growing industry 
                                                 
3
 Pavitt drew on a variety of sources to construct his taxonomy, including the organizational theory of 
Woodward , 1965). 
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can be populated both by brand new companies and by companies that have the resources and 
the competences to enter into the new field by reusing their accumulated competences. 
The new techno-economic paradigm is not just shaped by large firms. All the companies 
mentioned, in spite of the invaluable contribution they have provided to the coming of the 
information society, are not sufficient to shape our economic life: without a myriad of smaller 
and often unknown firms, we would not be in a society that makes such intensive use of 
information. The fact that there is virtually no industry that does not benefit from ICTs shows 
the degree of pervasiveness and integration achieved today in the information society (ICTs 
are what David, 1990, and Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995 as well as others have labelled 
‘general purpose technologies’). 
 
3. Creative destruction or technological accumulation? 
 
To move from one techno-economic paradigm to another one is often a traumatic 
experience. Blade Runner describes a given society, but how smooth or traumatic is the 
change towards that particular society? Economists have for long debated the relative 
importance of the cumulative development of expertise, on the one hand, and the disruptive 
nature of change, on the other. Karl Marx compared capitalism to the ancient Greek myth of 
the giant Antaeus, who was able to obtain new energy every time he fell down and touched 
the earth. Marx underlined that capitalism needs economic crises to reorganize its production, 
to shift capital from the industries with lower profit margins and to reinvest it in the growing 
industries. 
Schumpeter, an economist who was a fierce opponent of Marx as well as being among 
his most devoted readers,
4
 also stressed the importance of disruptive change, noting that it, 
too, was associated with technological transformations. In one of his most quoted sentences – 
“Add successively as many mail coaches as you please, you will never get a railway thereby” 
(Schumpeter, 1934, p. 64) – he made it clear that radically new products and processes could 
not be obtained by incremental changes only. Discontinuities were therefore needed to allow 
the introduction of new technologies, and these were also likely to produce crises in the 
economic arena. Some could be confined to selected firms, industries, cities, regions or 
nations; others were likely to have a much broader impact. 
                                                 
4
 Schumpeter called his mentor, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, “the Marx of the bourgeoisie”. But, as noted by his 
pupil, Paolo Sylos-Labini (1970), he would have been pleased to acquire such a nick-name himself. On the 
influence of Marx’s thinking on Schumpeter, see Elliott (1980) and Rosenberg (2011). 
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Schumpeter stressed that there was not only a process of reorganization of capital, but 
also that such a process was associated with individual agency. Schumpeter, an admirer of 
Nietzsche as much as of Marx (on Nietzsche’s influence on Schumpeter, see Santarelli and 
Pesciarelli, 1990, and Reinert and Reinert, 2006), understood that changes occur not only 
because there is unanimated capital willing to grow, but because there are entrepreneurs, a 
sort of Nietzschean superman in the economic sphere, that search out and exploit new 
opportunities. It is out of these animal spirits, as Keynes (1936, pp. 161-162) labelled them, 
that inventions are transformed into innovations and eventually diffused up to the point that 
they shape economic and social life. 
The problem is therefore to understand which players will be able to grasp these 
opportunities. On some occasions they are associated with new, successful entrepreneurs: the 
automobile industry was shaped by Henry Ford and the electricity business by Thomas 
Edison. It would be difficult for us to imagine an information-based society without thinking 
of the rise of companies such as Microsoft, Apple, Oracle, Google, Amazon and Facebook, 
and we associate these with entrepreneurs such as Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Larry Ellison, Larry 
Page, Sergey Brin, Jeff Bezos and Mark Zuckerberg. These entrepreneurs understood earlier 
and better than others that the supply of information could become much larger than 
conceived in the past and that, in spite of the fact that its cost per unit would drop by orders 
of magnitude (compare the cost of a telegram to the cost of an email), new technological 
opportunities were so huge that the overall market would grow. 
On other occasions, established firms that have already accumulated organizational 
resources, labour and capital are the first to understand that times are changing and to adjust 
to the new paradigm. If they do not manage to do that, they are likely to be locked into their 
existing market and to decline with it. If, on the other hand, they manage to use their skills 
and competences to explore new opportunities, they may jump into a new profitable business. 
Take the case of Eastman Kodak and Fujifilm, two companies competing in the same core 
market, photographic film (The Economist, 2012; Gebremeskel, Tesfaye and Nguyen, 2012; 
Nonaka et al., 2014). The former has not managed to adjust to the digital revolution in 
photography; the latter has done so and, exploiting its knowledge of consumers and markets, 
has successfully managed to jump into a new technological paradigm, becoming a leader in 
digital technology (and indeed now aspiring to become one in pharmaceuticals).
5
 
                                                 
5
 See Peter Evans, ‘Lure of cancer drug breakthrough drives pharma chief executives’, The Sunday Times, 5 
June 2016. 
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Change is therefore driven not only by disruption but also by continuity. Disruption 
does not necessarily lead to progress or to greater economic efficiency, and if it is not 
properly managed it can lead not only to company losses, but to societal damages as well.
6
 
Competences and skills are needed to upgrade production, and they are often accumulated by 
individuals and organizations over many years of experimentation. The potential of creative 
destruction should be compared to that of creative accumulation, which assumes that 
individuals and organizations with an appropriate stock of competences are better positioned 
to introduce successful changes.
7
 
Nelson and Winter (1982) and Malerba and Orsenigo (1995) have already taught us that 
there is no reason to assume that either creative destruction or creative accumulation can 
explain the process of change in all industries. Table 2 compares the characteristics of the 
models of creative accumulation and creative destruction to show that there are cases in 
which each of the strategies may allow companies to prosper. In the creative accumulation 
model, large firms systematically exploit new technological opportunities as a method to 
maintain their market shares and to keep outsiders out of business. In the creative destruction 
model, major innovations are introduced by small companies that become big precisely 
because they have won the bet on the potential of their new products and processes. It is not 
difficult to find examples in business history where successful companies prospered 
according to each of the two models. But are these models equally suited to identifying the 
companies that will, one hopes, lead recovery form the current economic recession? 
 
4. Who is investing in innovation after the 2008 economic crisis? 
 
Much has been written about the origins of the latest economic crisis and there is no 
consensus yet on either its causes or its consequences. In less than a decade, we have 
witnessed both the 2001 Dot-com bubble mostly associated with the difficulty of ICTs in 
keeping up with speculative expectations, and the 2008 financial and economic crisis which 
originated in a traditional sector, namely housing. Besides the fuse that generated the crisis, is 
it possible to identify the underlying structural causes? We have learnt from Keynesian 
economics (see Kindleberger, 1978, and Minsky, 1986) that the trigger of major economic 
crisis is often the financial market. The speculative tendencies of the financial markets could 
                                                 
6
 The disruptive effects of innovation, praised by Christensen (1997), have been critically addressed by Lepore 
(2014). 
7
 One way to assess the relative importance of accumulation and destruction is to look at company case-studies 
see, e.g., Tripsas (1997) on the typesetter industry. 
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be tamed by good regulations. Ultimately a lender of last resort helps to avoid the deepening 
and the dissemination of adverse consequences.  
The Kindleberger-Minsky model is also able to explain the 2008 events (see Shiller, 
2008): speculative trends in the financial markets were not held in check by regulation (at 
least, not in the United States), but the willingness of governments and central banks to act as 
lenders of last resort has helped to prevent a deepening of the crisis. But can the crisis, or at 
least the difficulty in achieving an effective and timely economic recovery, also be linked 
with the drying up of technological opportunities and, therefore, with the difficulty of 
sustaining the expectations of high and steady growth? In other words, is there a convincing 
economic explanation linked to the rate of innovation that could be integrated with the 
financial analysis of the crisis? 
According to a pessimistic view, it is now difficult to foresee technological 
opportunities comparable to those that the world economy experienced in the 1950s and 
1960s. The rate of economic growth of these decades (what Angus Maddison, 1992, has 
labelled as the golden age) is likely to prove unique in history. Gordon (2012; 2016) has 
argued that “the rapid progress made over the past 250 years could well turn out to be a 
unique episode in human history”. More optimistic observers, in contrast, claim that 
technological opportunities are still present, and they can guarantee new jobs and new 
prospects, provided the economic and social systems allow for their introduction and 
diffusion (Perez, 2013; Mokyr, 2013). 
Eight years on from the beginning of the economic crisis, and with a few signs of 
economic recovery emerging, the core question is: in which direction will the world economy 
now grow? Which industries and technologies will take the lead? These are the core issues 
discussed by policy makers, business leaders and others. Perhaps economists of innovation 
should also offer some insights. 
The first way to explore this is to check the willingness of economic actors to bear the 
costs and risks of innovation. Since investment in innovation represents a bet on the future, 
firms invest in new and improved products, processes and services when they expect that 
they will be able to repay the costs thorough successful market reception. We already know 
that innovation, more than other forms of investment, is an uncertain activity. Some projects 
may manage to introduce successful innovations that will repay the initial costs several times 
over, while others may not succeed in generating commercially successful innovations at all. 
In spite of this, businessmen’s willingness to invest in innovation indicates a propensity not 
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only to bear risks, but also to play the game. Moreover, without playing, there will never be 
winners. 
The research that Andrea Filippetti, Marion Frenz and I have carried out has tried to 
identify businesses’ reaction in terms of innovation investment as a consequence of the 2008 
financial crisis (Archibugi et al., 2013a; 2013b). Using Eurobarometer data, we have 
identified three groups of enterprises according to their decisions to decrease, maintain or 
increase innovation investment from 2006 to 2009. The number of enterprises that decreased 
their innovation investment rose from less than 10 per cent in the pre-crisis period to 27 per 
cent after the crisis. This is hardly a surprising result: in the middle of the credit crunch and 
with gloomy business opportunities, companies may be tempted to reduce all costs including 
investment, or may be forced to do so to preserve some earnings and hence to protect share 
prices. The behaviour of these enterprises may lead to a deepening of the recession: 
Keynesian economics has shown that a reduction of investment depresses aggregate demand, 
and Schumpeterian economics has indicated that a reduction in the rate of innovation may 
lead to stagnation. 
Those that are confident of the virtues of technological accumulation would be 
reassured to discover that as many as 60 per cent of enterprises kept their innovative 
investment unchanged: there is apparently an innovative routine that it is not affected, not 
even by major events such as the 2008 financial crisis (before the crisis, about half of the 
enterprises reported steady innovation investment). For most economic organizations, steady 
knowledge accumulation is vital to their survival. The number of enterprises that behaved 
anti-cyclically, i.e. that increased innovation investment after the crisis, is comparatively 
small: a mere 9 per cent. If we compare it to the situation before the crisis when as many as 
40 per cent of enterprises were increasing their innovation investment, we can really 
appreciate how the decision to expand innovative activities may be affected by adverse 
events. Could such a small number of daring enterprises have a “detonator” effect on the 
whole economy? 
Here lies a fundamental difference between investment in general and investment for 
innovation in particular, a difference implicit in the Schumpeterian tradition but never 
properly assimilated by Keynesian economics. While investment in general is a steady 
proportion of aggregate demand, investment in innovation has unpredictable economic 
effects. A few successful innovative projects may create the Schumpeterian band-wagon 
effect, generating jobs, profits and structural change that could potentially revitalize the 
whole economy. The innovation multiplier can be much larger than the investment multiplier.  
12 
 
The effect of the innovation multiplier is not equally distributed across the economic space, 
and we see that there are exceptional agglomerations in selected cities, regions and nations. It 
is no surprise that the areas with the most sustained economic growth rates are also generally 
those which entered first into the innovative driving sectors. 
In some European countries, the number of companies that have maintained or even 
increased innovative investment is greater than the number of companies that have reduced it. 
Within Europe, the most innovative nations, such as Sweden, Switzerland, Finland and 
Germany, were the ones least affected by the crisis. This might also be the result of other 
institutional factors such as their rather conservative banking regulations compared to those 
of liberal market economies. Nevertheless, these countries cannot avoid continuing to invest 
since they are highly specialized in areas where you innovate or perish. If they stop 
innovating, they may well be forced out of business.
8
 
It is instructive to compare Europe with other continents. In a large national innovative 
system such as the USA, knowledge-intensive states such as California have also increased 
their R&D expenditure after the economic crisis, while other, less innovation-intensive states 
have reduced it. In emerging economies, including China and India, the growth of 
innovation-related activities has been so phenomenal that the presence of an economic crisis 
can scarcely be noted from time-series statistics on R&D or patents. One of the consequences 
of an economic crisis is also to accelerate change across regions, and we are aware that, at the 
end of the economic crisis, the OECD member countries will have to compete with more 
assertive and more capable emerging areas. 
The profile of the innovators becomes fundamental in attempting to predict what the 
overall economic impact of the investment will be. Who is likely to generate new ideas and 
introduce innovations? In other words, who will “swim against the stream”? Our data 
associate such enterprises with the following traits: 
 
 They tend to be of small size. 
 They had an R&D department before the crisis. 
 There is a high proportion of young enterprises (created after 2001).  
 They combine innovation with the exploration of new market opportunities. 
                                                 
8
 These findings are consistent with Amore (2015), who has shown that many companies manage to capitalize 
their innovative routine even in bad times. 
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 Their competitive strategy is more likely to be based on products than on costs.9 
 
Eurobarometer data are not particularly robust, providing an indication of the broad 
trend but no reliable data on how much is being spent on innovation. However, data based on 
the Community Innovation Survey for the UK seems to confirm this picture (Archibugi et al., 
2013b), in particular in terms of a greater concentration of innovative resources in fewer 
companies. In other words, there are signs to suggest that recovery will be led by creative 
new enterprises rather than incumbent ones. This would confirm the idea that during crises 
radical new opportunities are less likely to be exploited by incumbents, while newcomers 
may exhibit the energy and the willingness to challenge the current steady state (Dosi et al., 
2008). We have detailed an identikit of the innovators: but where they will innovate? 
 
5. Where are emerging technological opportunities? 
 
Already in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, Daniel Bell (1973) predicted that 
information would replace goods as the leading product, and that service industries would 
replace manufacturing as the major employer. In a similar vein, Toffler (1980) tried to 
identify the set of technologies that would serve a post-industrial society. Both these 
predictions were fulfilled but this, in turn, required tools able to assess the economic and 
social impact of emerging technologies. 
Dosi (1982) and Freeman (1992) made an attempt to identify technologies that could 
create a genuine revolution. In the early 1980s, Freeman (1984a) set out five criteria to 
identify the emerging technologies of greatest impact: 
1) drastic reduction in the costs of many products and services; 
2) dramatic improvement in the technical characteristics of many products and 
processes; 
3) social and political acceptability; 
4) environmental acceptability; 
5) pervasive effects throughout the economic system, i.e. the potential to become what 
was later labelled as a general purpose technology. 
                                                 
9
 Our data only accounts for surviving enterprises and therefore are not able to detect those that may fail after a 
short period. However, other evidence corroborates the intuition that small innovative companies have lower 
survival expectancy (see Buddelmeyer et al., 2009; Dosi et al., 2008). 
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Using these criteria, he was able to predict that micro-electronics was going to become 
the back-bone of the coming techno-economic paradigm, while the economic and social 
impact of nuclear technology, then considered by some commentators as a would-be leading 
innovation, was grossly exaggerated. 
Business analysts invest much time in exploring market and technological 
opportunities.
10
 A recent and very detailed attempt to identify and explore new technological 
opportunities was released by the McKinsey Global Institute (Manyika et al., 2013). They 
tried to identify the core technologies expected to have a major impact by 2025. The four 
criteria they used are: 
 
1. Technology is rapidly advancing or experiencing breakthroughs. 
2. The potential scope of impact is broad. 
3. Significant economic value could be affected. 
4. Economic impact is potentially disruptive. 
 
As can be seen, the McKinsey exercise follows very closely the Schumpeterian 
tradition as set out many years earlier by Freeman (1984a), Perez (2002) and also Dosi 
(1982). 
The top technologies identified in the McKinsey foresight exercise in terms of 
substantial growth are all in the ICT area (see Table 3). The top four, Mobile Internet, 
Automation of knowledge work, Internet of things and Cloud technology all belong directly to 
the ICT cluster. For the next two, Advanced robotics and Autonomous vehicles, although they 
seemingly belong to the Machinery and Transport industries, the core innovative component 
is software. The next six emerging technologies are predicted to have a lower economic 
impact, but are also associated with a broader knowledge base. Amongst these we find Next-
generation genomics, the fundamental component needed to implement the Blade Runner’s 
Replicant, Advanced materials, and issues associated with energy production and distribution 
such as Energy storage, Renewable energy and Advanced oil and gas exploration. 3D 
printing, again heavily based on software, seems to be another important extension of the 
information society. 
Science and technology indicators provide a somewhat similar picture. If we 
concentrate on the two clusters of ICTs and Biotech, we find that patent applications in 1981, 
                                                 
10
 For a recent scholarly attempt to define what is meant by an “emergent technology”, see Rotolo et al. (2015). 
Most of the attempts considered here were based more on intuition than rigorous analysis. 
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at a very early stage in both technologies, numbered around 1,000 in ICTs compared with 
119 in Biotech. Both fields have grown exponentially, and in 2012 there were some 60,000 
patents in ICTs, while there were less than 10,000 in Biotech (see Figure 1). In spite of the 
significant different propensity to patent (see Danguy, et al., ), these numbers confirm the 
impression that while ICTs have become a general purpose technology, developed by 
companies belonging to a variety of different product industries and used in an even larger 
number of applications, Biotech is still largely confined to specific products and areas, 
notably human health and food. The profit-seeking community, as represented by the patents 
taken out, has clearly made a greater investment and has more optimistic expectations 
regarding ICTs than Biotech. The problem with technology indicators, however, is that they 
may report what is already in the pipe-line rather than the innovations that will fulfil their full 
potential at some stage in the future. Data from scientific publications, which are more likely 
to reflect the activities promoted by the academic community and the public sector, reveal a 
rather different picture: the Web of Science reports a basin with more than six million 
publications with the word DNA and just over one and a half million with the word 
semiconductor. We need more data on the current direction of scientific opportunities and 
this is not sufficient evidence to infer that academic research has already moved in another 
direction. But it seems that scientific and technological indicators point out at diverging 
trends. 
If the trends revealed by technology indicators and the predictions of McKinsey prove 
to be accurate, the next decade will continue to be dominated by the ICT techno-economic 
paradigm while the Biotech cluster will account for only 5-10 per cent of the expected 
economic potential of new technologies. We would expect a consolidation and deepening of 
the current paradigm rather than the emergence of radically new technologies. Biotech, 
anticipated as an emerging industry, and not only by Ridley Scott (see Orsenigo, 1989), may 
still have to wait its turn since, thus far, it has not fulfilled the earlier optimistic expectations. 
Economists of innovation soon recognized the very peculiar characteristic of the Biotech 
industry and four factors were singled out (see Pisano, 2006). First of all, the major 
breakthroughs were generated in universities and in publicly funded research centres. Second, 
the business sector, often though a direct affiliation of academic staff, was very fast in 
exploring its commercial potential. Third, the industry found new forms of financing based 
on expectations that research could bring new and successful drugs to the market (Orsenigo, 
1989). Fourth, the lag between R&D and product innovation has proven to be longer than 
originally expected. The fundamental scientific advances which occurred several years ago 
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have not yet been exploited in terms of sales, profits or job creation and have not led, thus far, 
to a distinctive new type of company. 
What has happened to the pioneering companies in the area seems to confirm this 
impression: most of the ground-breaking companies in Biotech have been acquired by other, 
larger companies: Genentech was eventually fully acquired by Hoffmann-La Roche in 2009, 
and Genzyme by Sanofi in 2011, indicating that the main output, so far, has been knowledge 
rather than commercial products entering the market. Very large firms have acquired the 
pioneering companies because of their knowledge and competences. The business leaders in 
ICTs, such as Microsoft, Google and Facebook, have exhibited a rather different pattern: they 
started as small companies and have grown to their current size, up to the point where they 
possessed the resources to acquire fast-growing companies based on new ideas and 
technologies such as Skype, Android and WhatsApp. The process of creative destruction of 
the ICT industry, which dominated for nearly three decades, has now turned into one of 
creative accumulation, with grown-up companies able to scan and exploit new opportunities, 
including through the acquisition of small and emerging companies. This suggests that the 
dominant techno-economic paradigm is now being consolidated through adoption, 
development and diffusion. 
 
6. Questioning the coming paradigm 
 
One of the key characteristics of disruptive technologies is that they do not knock 
gently at the door: they enter social and economic life suddenly and unexpectedly. To look at 
R&D expenditure by considering patents taken out and scientific publications alone could be 
misleading, since they point to a Schumpeterian swarming that is already at a relatively 
advanced stage. Business reports show that in 2014 the Biotech industry exceeded all 
previous records in terms of R&D expenditure and net income (see Ernst and Young, 2015). 
Even if their overall economic impact is not yet comparable to that for ICTs, these new 
opportunities could play an unexpected role, especially if properly combined with ICTs. In 
the past we have seen how steam power and mechanical engineering, synthetic materials and 
electrical machinery evolved simultaneously. Should we expect a new alliance between ICTs 
and Biotech? 
Theodor Adorno warned us that “life does not live”. To paraphrase him, technological 
opportunities do not enter into economic and social life without deliberate efforts and 
choices. We should be able to envisage new forms of organization associated with emerging 
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technology. ICTs have already changed our lifestyle even more than our economic life: they 
have generated jobs and profits, but above all they have transformed the way we use our time 
and interact with the world. Biotech could bring about even more radical social 
transformations at the core of our life. Why have these not yet been delivered? What can be 
done to unleash their potential? There are a few basic questions that need to be addressed. 
 
 Investment in Biotech has mostly been made by business corporations. Universities and 
public laboratories, in spite of the fact that they were the origin of many scientific 
advances, are today second in line. As noted by Pisano (2006), a science-based industry 
with a very long gestation period before new discoveries are transformed into products 
may encounter major problems if it is driven by profit-seekers. Many of the new openings 
in Biotech are either kept confidential or protected by intellectual property rights, and this 
may delay the diffusion of knowledge. In an area where most advances are interrelated, 
public sharing could be crucial to avoid dead-ends. Is profit-driven research today 
obstructing the industry’s potential? 
 
 If more active public and non-profit research is needed, how should it be integrated with 
market-oriented research? A revision of the current division of labour between public and 
private players may be needed. The triple-helix model (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000) 
has somehow blessed the idea that the leading dancer in innovation should be the business 
sector even if the business sector funds a very small proportion of the R&D carried out in 
Universities and public research centres (Archibugi and Filippetti, 2016). Should we give 
universities and public research centres greater responsibility in efforts to disseminate and 
distribute the knowledge to final users? 
 
 To what extent could the full potential of Biotech be tapped if properly integrated with the 
dominant general purpose technologies, i.e. ICTs? Is there the possibility that Biotech will 
manage to reinvigorate what has already been delivered by ICTs? In the past, cross-
fertilization has multiplied the benefits of new technological opportunities. Can we 
forecast a successful alliance between ICTs and Biotech? 
 
 Finally, there is the problem of identifying the impact of new technological opportunities.  
Do we have appropriate indicators to measure their economic impact in a changing 
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context? So far, we have mostly concentrated on economic indicators, such as 
employment, sales and profits. These indicators are certainly crucial for business 
performance, but they need to be integrated with others able to assess their social benefits. 
The rise of Biotech may be one of the cases that force us to assess the potential of 
radically new innovations partly through social indicators, such as life expectancy or 
quality of life. If we do, perhaps we may be forced to re-evaluate the relative impact of 
Biotech and ICTs. 
 
7. Back to the cinema? 
 
As usual, cinema has been quick to forecast some of these opportunities: the film 
Transcendence by Wally Pfister already describes the total integration of Biotech, ICTs and 
another emerging technology of the 21
st
 century, nano-technology. This science fiction film 
has taken into account the reality of exponential expansion of nano-technologies and their 
capacity to be as pervasive as ICTs have been over the last thirty years. The location should 
be noted: like Blade Runner, the film takes place in California, although the final parts, those 
devoted to the birth of revolutionary innovations, have been set in New Mexico, an area 
envisaged to become the leader from scratch. Such a suggestion might seem peculiar if the 
size and the absolute amount of R&D expenditure is taken into account, but it may seem less 
implausible given that New Mexico has the highest R&D to GDP ratio in the USA (as high as 
8 per cent, see National Science Foundation, 2014, Chapter 8, Table 8-40). 
The film Transcendence is suggesting that the integration of various domains of 
knowledge could be crucial and this will perhaps be another case where science fiction is able 
to provide an inspiration to captains of industry, scientists, bankers and politicians; 
sometimes science fiction may be pioneering and may act as a source for suggestions to be 
implemented in the real word (see the challenging review on the interactive relation between 
science fiction and innovation by Bassett et al., 2013). The film shows that the quality of 
human life could change substantially and the next major advances to shape our lives will not 
be associated with our ability to connect everywhere and with everybody, but with a better 
understanding of how our bodies work and how to use this information to increase our well-
being. Portable devices that tell us instantaneously when it will rain this afternoon are already 
installed in the mobiles in our pockets, and there are apps teaching us how to prevent diseases 
in different environments. Soon new devices will be able, on the basis of our genome, to 
inform us of the effects of every single event in our organism and possibly even to fix it. 
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Through the exploitation of big data, new challenges such as growing urbanization, an ageing 
population and environmental risks could also be addressed through more advanced 
instruments. 
If I watch Blade Runner again with my grand-children, my forecast is that they will be 
totally unimpressed by the innovations in both ICTs and Biotech, as an artificial cat tries to 
jump up on their lap. I wager that my grand-children will note with wry amusement that the 
film underestimated progress in all respects since the real advances will be occurring in nano-
technologies or in areas for which I will have no understanding. When they pet me as the 
thick and rather dumb grandfather, I will shield myself with an evergreen lesson: economists, 
futurologists and business analysts often get it wrong. But artists, real artists, more often tend 
to get it right! 
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Table 1 - Phases of Capitalist Development and Pavitt's Categories of Firms 
 
           
Period Successive  Industrial organisation Typical industries Rise of Pavitt's 
 
Techno-Economic Paradigms 
  
category of firms 
       
     1770-
1830 Early Mechanisation 
Growing importance of 
small  
Textiles, Potteries, 
Machinery 
Supplier 
dominated 
  
manufacturing firms 
  
     1840-
1880 Steam power and railway 
Separation been producers 
of  Mechanical engineering,  
Specialized 
suppliers 
  
capital and consumption 
goods Steel and Coal 
 
     1890-
1930 
Opportunities associated to 
scientific discoveries Emergence of large firms Chemicals, Electrical Science based 
   
machinery, Engineering 
 
     
     1940-
1980 
Fordist and Taylorist 
revolutions 
Oligopolistic competition 
for   
Automobiles, Synthetic 
products,  Scale intensive 
  
mass consumption Consumer durables 
 
     
1980- 
Information and 
communication Networks of firms, strong Microelectronics, Telecoms,  
Information 
intensive 
2010 
 
user-producer interactions Software 
         
     Source: Author's Elaborations on Freeman (1987), Table 15. Last column derived from Pavitt 
(1984; 1990). 
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Table 2 - Innovative firms’ characteristics under the creative accumulation and creative destruction models 
 
Categories Creative accumulation Creative destruction 
Characteristics of the 
innovating firms 
 
Innovations are driven by large, incumbent firms that 
seek new solutions through formal research exploiting 
their pre-existing capabilities. 
Small firms, new entrants are the key drivers in the 
innovation process. They use innovation and 
economic turbulence to acquire market share from 
incumbent firms. 
Type of knowledge 
sources 
High relevance of past innovations and accumulated 
knowledge. Importance of formal R&D, in-house but also 
jointly performed or externally acquired. 
Greater relevance of collaborative arrangements 
leaning towards the applied knowledge base (other 
firms). Exploration of new markets and technological 
opportunities.  
Type of innovations 
 
The innovation process is dominated by a large number of 
incremental innovations. 
Organizational routines dominate the generation of 
innovations. 
The emphasis is on path-breaking innovations often 
able to create new industries. 
New organizational forms contribute to generating 
innovations. 
Characteristics of the 
market  
Barriers to entry are high due to relative importance of 
appropriation and accumulation of knowledge and high 
costs of innovation. Dominance of oligopolistic markets.  
Technological advancement based on path dependent and 
cumulative technological trajectories. 
Low barriers to entry into the new industries. A high 
rate of entry and exit leads to low levels of 
concentration and high competition. Discontinuous 
technologies are available that generate growing 
markets and new opportunities. 
 
Source: Archibugi and Filippetti (2011) on the ground of insights of Freeman (1984a; 1992), Dosi (1982); Pavitt (1984; 1990), Malerba and 
Orsenigo (1995). 
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Table 3 – Estimated potential economic impact of technologies from sized applications in 2025,  
including consumer surplus $ trillion, annual to 2025 
 
 Technologies Estimated impact 
  Min Max 
1 Mobile Internet 3.7 10.8 
2 Automation of Knowledge work 5.2 6.7 
3 Internet of things 2.7 6.2 
4  Cloud technology 1.7 6.2 
5 Advanced robotics 1.7 4.5 
6 Autonomous vehicles 0.2 1.9 
7 Next generation genomics 0.7 1.6 
8 Energy storage 0.1 0.6 
9 3D printing 0.2 0.6 
10 Advanced materials 0.2 0.5 
11 Advanced oil and gas exploration 0.1 0.5 
12 Renewable energy 0.2 0.3 
 TOTAL 16.7 40.4 
 
Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2013) 
 
27 
 
Figure 1 – Patents in ICTs and Biotech, 1980 - 2012 
 
 
 
Source: OECD database, elaboration on Patent Cooperation Treaty by year of application,  
